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LITIGATING AGAINST THE ARTIFICIALLY  
INTELLIGENT INFRINGER  
Yvette Joy Liebesman  
Julie Cromer Young** 
ABSTRACT 
Many scholars have posited whether a computer possessing Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) could be considered an author as defined per the Copyright 
Act of 1976. What was once a thought experiment is now approaching reality. 
The focus has primarily been on whether an AI meets the requirements from 
a purely objective legal framework, or whether an AI could be an author 
based on the doctrines of incentives, independent creation, and creativity.  
However, another feature of authorship is the ability to be held liable if 
whether an AI or any non-human can be an author, then part of that 
determination should be to consider whether the being in question that 
created the work can be held liable as an infringer, and, as a logical extension, 
whether that being can in fact be sued. This involves considering issues from 
the theoretical, like civil procedure and remedies, to the practical, such as 
legal representation and discovery. How is an AI served with a lawsuit? What 
AI even bound by our laws?  
This morass of legal headaches goes beyond any doctrinal issues 
regarding authorship and provides ample reason to keep legal authorship in 
the hands of humans or entities controlled by humans. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, what had once been a thought experiment has now 
approached reality. Smart computers possessing the ability to learn have gone 
far beyond the depiction of the nuclear war-starting WOPR that learns that 
playing tic-tac-toe is futile.1 Now, algorithms are responsible for determining 
2 shopping habits,3 and typical calendar.4 
Smart phones already suggest email language based o
texts and messages.5 Before long, the writing suggestions will be longer, and 
the subject matter will undoubtedly become more comprehensive.  
 
1 WARGAMES (MGM 1983). 
2 See Alice Williams, 3 Ways Artificial Intelligence Is Turning Entertainment on Its Head, KSL 
(Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ksl.com/article/43925538/3-ways-artificial-intelligence-is-turning-
entertainment-on-its-head. 
3 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,028,894 (issued on Apr. 18, 2006); Christine Persaud, How AI Will 
Change Your Shopping Habits, FUTURITHMIC (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://www.futurithmic.com/2019/03/18/how-ai-will-change-your-shopping-habits/; Anna Schaverien, 
How Retailers Can Adapt to A.I. and the Future of Shopping, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/annaschaverien/2019/03/18/ey-future-of-shopping-retail-ai-artificial-
intelligence/#c7c4e2f4a159.  
4 See, e.g., Jared Newman, Woven Is a Calendar Assistant You Might Actually Use, FAST 
COMPANY (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90264212/woven-is-a-calendar-assistant-you-
might-actually-use. 
5 See, e.g., Anne McCarthy, How Smart Email Could Change the Way We Talk, BBC (Aug. 12, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190812-how-ai-powered-predictive-text-affects-your-brain; 
Alison DeNisco Rayome, t Reply Is an Example of What Real AI Will Look Like for 
Frontline Workers, TECH REPUBLIC (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/gmails-smart-
reply-is-an-example-of-what-real-ai-will-look-like-for-frontline-workers/. 
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Many scholars6 have posited whether a computer possessing Artificial 
Intelligence (AI)7 could be considered an author as defined per the Copyright 
Act of 1976.8 The focus of these scholars has primarily been on whether an 
AI met the requirements from a purely objective, legal framework, to be an 
author based on the doctrines of incentives,9 independent creation,10 and 
creativity.11 
authorship.12 
However, another feature of authorship is the ability to be held liable if 
13 When 
contemplating whether an AI or any non-human can be an author under 
copyright law, then part of that examination should be whether the AI which 
created the work can be held liable as an infringer of copyright. To date, when 
AI-based copying has been the basis for an infringement lawsuit, either a 
human or corporate owner, has been the defendant not the AI itself. For 
 
6 See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 
2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 5 (2012); Nina I. Brown, Artificial Authors: A Case for Copyright in 
Computer-Generated Works, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV 1, 1 (2018); Yvette Joy Liebesman, The 
Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological Advances, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 
154, 172 77 (2010); Jared Vasconcellos Grubow, O.K. Computer: The Devolution of Human Creativity 
and Granting Musical Copyrights to Artificially Intelligent Joint Authors, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 387, 388
89 (2018). 
7 ially intelligent computer or 
computer program, not just the artificial intelligence feature of the program. An artificially intelligent 
computer program can be best defined as a computer program which is created to be an autonomous 
 of learning without being specifically programmed by a human. . . . [It] has a built-
in algorithm that allows it to learn from data input, and to evolve and make future decisions that may be 
 Artificial Intelligence and Copyright, WIPO 
MAGAZINE (Oct. 2017), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/05/article_0003.html; see also 
Williams, supra note 2 ink for itself without 
 
8 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2020). 
9 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 6 at 20 -
generated works could provide valuable incentives for the creators of the machines that generate those 
works. The algorithms do not need the incentive to create works, but the programmers need the incentive 
 
10 See id. at 24 27; see also Schlomit Yanksky-Ravid, & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez, 
Copyrightability of Artworks Produced by Creative Robots and Originality: The Formality-Objective 
Model, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH 1, 1 2 (2018). 
11 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 6 at 24 27; see also Bridy, supra note 6; Vasconcellos Grubow, 
supra note 6 at 408 411. 
12 See, e.g., supra note 6; see also James Grimmelman, -
Authored Work , 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403 (2016).  
13 See infra Sections II and III. Since an AI has no money and cannot open a bank account or 
otherwise accumulate wealth, then damages are meaningless. Even an injunction would be almost 
impossible to enforce. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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example, in Authors Guild v. Google,14 one of the infringing activities about 
ch tool, 
which helps users to identify linguistic and literary patterns across the vast 
Google Library.15 The Authors Guild sued Google, but the mechanism 
 
its various features, and it undoubtedly controls and benefits from its AI 
functions. But this will not always be the case. As Microsoft is not liable for 
the infringements penned by those who use Microsoft Word to write them, 
there may come a time when an AI architect is not liable for infringements 
created independently by its AI.  
AI infringement liability considers issues from the theoretical, like due 
process and remedies, to the practical, such as legal representation and 
discovery. Scholars have previously looked to substantive issues from 
general torts committed by robots,16 to the copyright issues arising from 
inputting copyrighted material for the purpose of machine learning,17 to 
whether AIs can meet the creative, originality or other statutory requirements 
to be authors.18 Our research focuses instead on other considerations that 
determine whether an AI can be the legal author under the Copyright Act: 
specifically, if it is procedurally possible for an AI to be a defendant in an 
infringement action with regards to personal jurisdiction and remedies.19 
Several significant procedural problems would arise if an AI could be 
considered the author of a work under the Copyright Act.20 This article first 
discusses issues surrounding AI as an infringing author, then AI as a plaintiff. 
We then summarize some of the problems if a guardianship system is used 
 
14 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2015). 
15 Id.  
16 See Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311 (2019) 
(discussing allocating responsibility when robots commit a tort resulting in physical harm or death, and 
 
17 See, e.g., Benjamin L.W. Sobel, , 41 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 45 (2017). 
18 See, e.g., Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52 
AKRON L. REV. 813 (2018). 
19 This article touches on two of the procedural and logistical issues that would have to be 
addressed if AIs are to be considered authors under the Copyright Act. There are several others, which are 
addressed in the longer version of this article, such as vicarious liability and contributory infringement by 
a human having control over the AI, subject matter jurisdiction, and others. In addition, the longer article 
also examines these issues from the position of the AI as the author/plaintiff. 
20 As noted supra, while some are addressed here, other issues are examined in more detail in a 
forthcoming article. 
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if an AI can satisfy the doctrinal arguments regarding authorship, there 
remain serious constraints with regard to liability of an AI copyright owner.21 
II.  JURISDICTION, SERVICE OF PROCESS, AND OTHER CIVIL 
PROCEDURE DILEMMAS 
When a person infringes upon a
cause of action against that creator of the infringing work. If the creator of an 
infringing work is an AI, it stands to reason that the copyright holder has a 
cause of action against the AI.22 However, the cause of action is meaningless 
if the plaintiff copyright owner does not or cannot enforce it by suing the 
infringer. Apart from the substantive questions of copyright law that are 
implicated (or not) by AI activities, several procedural issues may make a 
lawsuit against an AI infringer challenging. 
A reasonable place to start our examination of civil procedure issues is 
with the difficulties in establishing personal jurisdiction.23 Personal 
pro 24 It is long 
settled that personal jurisdiction extends to non-person defendants as well in 
the form of corporations.25  
The jurisdictional challenge that the AI defendant presents is, of course, 
that it is not a person, but the closest non-person analogy is imperfect. The 
AI could not file articles of incorporation without a human being named as 
 
21 This would also apply to Naruto, the crested macaque. Cf. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
22 We understand that an easy solution would be to sue the creator of the AI, and not the AI itself. 
However, this would be equivalent of suing Microsoft for works composed in Word or Smith-Corona for 
works composed on a typewriter. Cf. Liebesman, supra note 6
own the same computer for several 
the day the professor bought the computer, or the day the computer was built. A writing has the creation 
date and is copyrightable as of the day it was actually created and achieved fixa supra note 
18
PowerPoint the one who created it, not Microsoft. .  
23 Civil procedure issues implicated in a copyright infringement lawsuit would necessarily be 
federal in nature, as copyright infringement is exclusively within the jurisdiction of federal courts. See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2019). Personal jurisdiction in federal courts is determined 
on a state-by-state basis. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general 
 
24 Jurisdiction, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
25 See, e.g.
by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a person . . . 
capable of being treated as a citizen of that state . .  
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the incorporator26 or officers of the corporation.27 Even if another corporation 
is listed as the owner, the chain of ownership must eventually lead back to a 
human owner.28 Thus, for purposes of civil procedure and how it is treated as 
a defendant, an AI would have to be considered a person and not a 
corporation.29  
Establishing personal jurisdiction over AI as a defendant also requires a 
e are three 
basic types of personal jurisdiction: in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem.30 
Deeming AI to be property allows courts to exercise jurisdiction in rem, 
determining the rights and liabilities of the world with respect to that 
property.31 However, a copyright infringement case does not act like a pure 
 
26 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § One or more natural persons of the age of 
eighteen years, or more, may act as an incorporator of such corporation by signing and delivering in the 
 (emphasis added). 
27 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 351.046 (2004).  
Filing requirements. 
6. The document shall be executed: 
(1) By the chairman of the board of directors of a domestic or foreign corporation, by its 
president, or by another of its officers; 
(2) If directors have not been selected or the corporation has not been formed, by the 
incorporator(s); or 
(3) If the corporation is in the hands of a receiver, trustee, or other court-appointed 
fiduciary, by that fiduciary. 
7. The person executing the document shall sign it and state beneath or opposite his signature 
his name and the capacity in which he signs. The document may contain the corporate seal, an 
attestation by the secretary or an assistant secretary, an acknowledgment, verification or proof. 
11. A statement or document filed under this chapter represents that the person signing the 
knowledge and belief, subject to the penalties provided under section 575.040. 
28 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §  includes, without limitation, an 
individual, a foreign or domestic corporation whether not for profit or for profit, a partnership, a limited 
liability company, an unincorporated society or association, two or more persons having a joint or common 
 
29 Since an AI is considered an entity and not a business, then long arm statutes and case law 
would likely not be an issue and is thus not discussed in this article. 
30 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 2
judgment imposing obligations on persons (jurisdiction in personam) or affecting interests in property 
(jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem ; see also , 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
31 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877). 
Substituted service by publication, or in any other authorized form, may be sufficient to inform 
parties of the object of proceedings taken where property is once brought under the control of the 
court by seizure or some equivalent act. The law assumes that property is always in the possession 
of its owner, in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will inform him, 
not only that it is taken into the custody of the court, but that he must look to any proceedings 
authorized by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale. Such service may also be 
sufficient in cases where the object of the action is to reach and dispose of property in the State, or 
of some interest therein, by enforcing a contract or a lien respecting the same, or to partition it among 
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in rem action; at the end of the day, the plaintiff has no wish to determine 
rights over the AI, she merely wants to protect her authored work. A more 
suitable approach might be a quasi in rem approach, which allows a court in 
which the AI is located to attach the AI to the lawsuit, and still consider the 
liability particular to the copyright infringement action.32 However, because 
the remedy afforded the plaintiff in a quasi in rem action is limited to the 
value of the property attached here, the AI this may be a less attractive 
alternative for copyright plaintiffs, who in some instances may be entitled to 
statutory damages for infringement.33  
This leaves in personam jurisdiction, which determines the rights and 
liabilities of an individual defendant (as opposed to property).34 In personam 
jurisdiction is dependent upon residence (general in personam jurisdiction) 
or the location of the cause of action (specific in personam jurisdiction). 
General in personam jurisdiction is determined by the domicile of the 
defendant,35 which begs the question: Where does an AI reside? There is the 
36 such as via 
Amazon Web Services.37 Indeed, some of these servers store the same 
program remotely on different servers, to prevent the loss of one server from 
 
different owners, or, when the public is a party, to condemn and appropriate it for a public purpose. 
In other words, such service may answer in all actions which are substantially proceedings in rem. 
Id.  
32 This approach is not without precedent. See, e.g., Office Depot, Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d 696, 
703 (9th Cir. 2010) (exercising quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant judgment debtor where the 
registry of his domain names was located). 
33 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). 
[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead 
of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the 
action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which 
any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more 
than $30,000 as the court considers just. 
34 , 326 U.S. storically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in 
personam  
35 As recently as 2014, the Supreme Court has held that the test for general in personam 
jurisdiction for corporations is essentially domicile. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). 
in personam jurisdiction for individual defendants is domicile. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). 
36 exico.com, a collaborative effort of 
he practice of using a network 
of remote servers hosted on the Internet to store, manage, and process data, rather than a local server or a 
personal computer. Cloud Computing, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/cloud_computing 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
37 AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
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affecting the data stored on it.38 It would have to be determined whether the 
another location where the AI resides, sufficient to confer state citizenship 
upon it.39 
The final possibility is specific in personam jurisdiction, which would 
require a constitutional analysis to satisfy the minimum contacts analysis first 
introduced by International Shoe.40 However, the Supreme Court in J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro established that it is insufficient for the 
accountable for its actions wherever it lands.41 Similarly, the AI likely has no 
reasonable anticipation of the scope of its work, and bringing a lawsuit 
against an AI wherever the injury occurs though oftentimes preferable
could prove to be tricky. 
The question of contact-based jurisdiction, of course, is avoided 
altogether if the plaintiff can have the defendant served in the forum state. 
forum state, and under Rule 4(k) is not subject to an additional contacts 
analysis.42 This also leads to another problem: that of service of process.43 
How would you serve an AI with a lawsuit? Under Rule 4(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a person may be served several ways: by following 
state law regarding service, by delivery to the individual personally; leaving 
ith someone of suitable age and discretion who 
also resides there; or by delivering a copy to an agent or to someone 
authorized by law to receive service of process for the person.44 Yet, as with 
 
38 Google Cloud, for example, has geo-redundancies in multi-regional locations, and gives its 
Store It, Analyze It, Back It Up: Cloud Storage Updates Bring New Replication Options, GOOGLE CLOUD 
BLOG: STORAGE & DATA TRANSFER (Oct. 11, 2018), https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/storage-
data-transfer/store-it-analyze-it-back-it-up-cloud-storage-updates-bring-new-replication-options. 
39 A related issue is that of venue. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a), any action relating to copyrights 
may be instituted in which the defendant or 
for general in personam jurisdiction, a similar problem will exist in determining residence for venue in 
the federal courts (which is required due to exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction over copyright 
infringement suits. 28 U.S.C. § 1331).  
40 See generally 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
41 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011). 
42 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k), supra note 23; Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 620
21 ( asis of personal jurisdiction based on service on 
the defendant while the defendant is willingly present in the forum state). 
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4) (5). 
44 Serving an Individual Within a Judicial District of the United States. Unless federal law provides 
otherwise, an individual other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has 
been filed may be served in a judicial district of the United States by: 
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establishing personal jurisdiction, it may be difficult to determine where an 
AI resides. Perhaps the easiest way to solve this problem is to have service 
effectuated via Rule 4(e)(2)(C).45 Federal Rules could establish that the 
Secretary of State is authorized to receive service of process for AIs that are 
considered domiciled in the state, or a Guardian appointed for the AI could 
be the person authorized to receive service.46 Currently, however, they do 
not. 
If the server that hosts the AI program is located outside the United 
States, then Rule 4(f) would apply, extending service to individuals in foreign 
countries.47 
computer program resides may not recognize AIs as entities that can be 
authors under their Copyright statue or even capable of being sued. 48 If a 
 
(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general 
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made; or 
(2) doing any of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to 
of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a 
copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). 
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(C) (A person m agent 
 
46 There are various problems associated with using the Guardianship method to resolve issues of 
AIs as owners of copyrightable works, discussed in the forthcoming expanded article. 
47 This is under the assumption that the infringement is judiciable in the United States. For 
example, if the AI has published its work in the United States or in a country which is part of WIPO or 
another treaty that provides for relief by U.S. copyright owners. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) provides for: 
Serving an Individual in a Foreign Country. Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual
other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed may be served 
at a place not within any judicial district of the United States:  
(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, 
such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents;  
(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does 
not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give notice: 
its courts of general jurisdiction; 
(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or 
 by: (i) delivering a copy of the 
summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; or (ii) using any form of 
mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed 
receipt; or 
(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders. 
48 See Guadamuz, supra note 7 
see also World Intellectual Property 
Organization [WIPO], Spain: 25628 LEY 22/1987, de 11 de noviembre de Propiedad Intelectual [25628 
Law No. 22/1987 of November 11, 1987, on Intellectual Property] (Mar. 17, 1987) 
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/126598:  
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country limits authorship under its copyright act to works created by humans 
directly, service may not be possible on a non-human entity; the other country 
may enact laws to prohibit service on an AI domiciled in that country, 
running directly afoul of Rule 4(f).49 
The procedural issues of personal jurisdiction and service of process 
lead to another inquiry: if the AI is the defendant potentially liable for an 
infringement or anything is it entitled to procedural due process rights 
under the U.S. Constitution at all? The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
person of life, 
50 The Fifth Amendment 
similarly extends the concept of federal due process to persons.51 An AI is 
neither is a corporation, and courts have gone out of their way to extend due 
process protections to them. But, as noted above, an AI is not a corporation 
and makes even fewer individualized decisions (initially) than a corporation 
does. Affording an AI defendant any due process rights would require the 
courts to create another legal fiction extending personhood to AI.  
III. WHAT REMEDIES, IF ANY ARE AVAILABLE AGAINST AN AI? 
Even if one can successfully find an AI liable for copyright 
infringement, there may not be any possible remedies that could be enforced 
infringement suit by a mere Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
 
. . . los derechos que corresponden al autor, que es quien realiza la tarea puramente humana y 
personal de creación de la obra y que, por lo mismo, constituyen el núcleo esencial del objeto de la 
presente Ley y, por otra, los derechos reconocidos a determinadas personas físicas o jurídicas cuya 
intervención resulta indispensable para la interpretación o ejecución o para la difusión de las obras 
creadas por los autores. the rights corresponding to the author are determined, which is the one 
who performs the purely human and personal task of creating the work and which, therefore, 
constitute the essential core of the object of this Law and, on the other, the rights recognized by 
certain natural or legal persons whose intervention is essential for the interpretation or execution or 
for the dissemination of the works created by the authors.]. 
49 In fact, if U.S. laws do enable AI to be an author, and therefore able to be sued, then it could be 
 
50 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
51 U.S. CONST person
process of law. . hasis added). 
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Remedies in copyright infringement cases typically take three forms: 
actual damages, to compensate the infringed author for monetary losses due 
to the infringement; statutory damages; and injunctive relief.  
A. Actual Damages 
52 Presumably (and based on 
current technology), an AI does not have money, cannot open a bank 
account,53 or otherwise accumulate wealth. Without a source of funds, 
damages are meaningless. As a result, there would be no money from which 
a successful plaintiff copyright owner could recover. This is, of course, 
assuming that the infringing activity itself would generate no money. The 
Copyright Act points out that infringers do make profits from the 
infringement,54 and there is no reason that that profit-making activity could 
not be extended to AI, even if the AI itself is not receiving any of the proceeds 
from its creative endeavors.  
 
52 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2010).  
53 According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulations, 31 C.F.R. 
§ 1020.220(a)(2) (2020), Customer Identification Programs for banks, savings associations, credit unions, 
and certain non-Federally regulated banks must collect the following information from a new customer 
under the Customer Identification Program:  
(i) Customer information required (A) the bank must obtain, at a minimum, the following 
information from the customer prior to opening an account:  
(1) Name;  
(2) Date of birth, for an individual;  
(3) Address, which shall be: (i) For an individual, a residential or business street address; (ii) 
For an individual who does not have a residential or business street address, an Army Post 
Office (APO) or Fleet Post Office (FPO) box number, or the residential or business street 
address of next of kin or of another contact individual; or (iii) For a person other than an 
individual (such as a corporation, partnership, or trust), a principal place of business, local 
office, or other physical location; and  
(4) Identification number, which shall be: (i) For a U.S. person, a taxpayer identification 
number; or (ii) For a non-U.S. person, one or more of the following: A taxpayer identification 
number; passport number and country of issuance; alien identification card number; or number 
and country of issuance of any other government-issued document evidencing nationality or 
residence and bearing a photograph or similar safeguard. 
An AI would not be able to satisfactorily provide much of the required information. 
54 See 17 U.S.C
or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted 
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B.  Statutory Damages 
Instead of actual damages, a copyright owner may elect to recover 
statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action.55 Statutory 
damages are available in an amount from $750 to $30,000.56 If the copyright 
owner proves that the infringement was willful, then the court may increase 
statutory damages to $150,000 per infringement.57 
If the recovery of actual damages against an AI defendant by an author 
plaintiff was problematic, the recovery of statutory damages may be 
impossible. Opting for statutory damages suggests that the AI defendant may 
not have reaped profits from the infringing activity itself
then the question of actual money to satisfy the statutory damages returns. 
Moreover, even if the author plaintiff is able to prove willful infringement 
against an AI defendant, the problem of extra funds that are not allocated to 
profits or damages remains.58 
C.  Injunctions 
Professors Lemley and Casey have discussed, generally, remedies for 
robots with regard to injunctions.59 While an AI does not have the mobility 
associated with the tort-committing robot contemplated in their article,60 their 
arguments can still apply with regard to copyright infringement. While no 
physical harm results from copyright infringement, it is considered a tort of 
strict liability.61 The authors note that while it may seem that enforcing an 
injunction against a robot would be simpler than against a person or 
corporation, it is fraught with problems. A robot would be unable to use 
 
55 See id. § 504(c)(1).  
56 See id. 
57 See id. § 504(c)(2). 
58 Moreover, the question of statutory damages may be a dicey one for an author plaintiff to 
 had no reason to believe that [its] acts 
constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce [an] award of statutory 
See id. 
59 Lemley & Casey, supra note 16, at 1370 78. 
60 Id. 
of high-stake robotics systems including self-driving cars, medical diagnostic robots, and even 
experimental autonomous drones. Yet, even the most performant of these systems remains imperfect . . . 
[a]ccepting imperfection also means accepting the possibility that robotics systems will sometimes cause 
 
61 EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. M Copyright 
infringement is a strict liability offense in the sense that a plaintiff is not required to prove unlawful intent 
or ). 
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common sense when circumstances change and make allowances for when 
there is sufficient justification for departing from the injunction.62  
To issue an effective injunction that causes a robot to do 
what we want it to do (and nothing else) requires both 
extreme foresight and extreme precision in drafting it. If 
injunctions are to work at all, courts will have to spend a lot 
more time thinking about exactly what they want to happen 
and all the possible circumstances that could arise. If past 
experience is any indication, courts are unlikely to do it very 
is two-fold: words are notoriously bad at conveying our 
intended meaning, and people are notoriously bad at 
predicting the future. Co
their deep understanding of the law, and so we should expect 
errors in translation even if the injunction is flawlessly 
written. And if we fall into any of these traps, the 
consequences of drafting the injunction incompletely may be 
quite severe.63 
Analogizing this to an injunction for a copyright infringement claim, a 
court order enjoining an infringing activity would have to take into account 
Fair Use,64 which could be an insurmountable obstacle, considering the 
nature 
use. 
Lemley and Casey also point out that an AI can simply ignore an 
injunction with impunity.65 An AI which refuses to obey an injunction or 
otherwise stop infringing on a copyright faces no consequences it has no 
money from which a contempt citation fine can be levied, and it cannot be 
jailed. Destruction of the non-compliant infringing AI seems extreme.66  
 
62 Lemley & Casey, supra note 16, at 1371 (discussing the problems with enjoining robots and 
ons  
63 Id. at 1373. 
64 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2019). 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
. . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether 
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect 
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
65 Lemley & Casey, supra note 16, at 1374. 
66 Id. at 1374 75. 
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D.  Consequences of an Uncollectable Remedy  
In a complaint in federal court, the plaintiff must plead three things: a 
short and plain statement of the claim; and the relief sought.67 In a copyright 
infringement claim against an AI defendant, the first requirement would not 
be problematic. As mentioned above, subject matter jurisdiction for 
copyright infringement claims is exclusive in the federal courts.68  
statement of the relief sought. The danger for the author plaintiff against an 
AI defendant is the possibility that there would not be an adequate claim for 
relief. Without an adequate remedy at law, the legal representative of an AI 
could win a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted;69 and if a defendant is 
determined to be judgment-proof, a plaintiff runs the risk of dismissal.70 Even 
problem in suing an AI is whether it is a fiscally responsible decision to file 
a lawsuit in the first place when the plaintiff knows the likelihood of recovery 
statutorily diminish if the author fails to bring a lawsuit against the 
infringer,71 not suing becomes a more attractive option, though issues such 
as laches72 and estoppel73 could arise. 
 
67 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
68 See supra note 39; 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2019). 
69 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). However, just because a litigant cannot recover would not 
necessarily render the complaint baseless; not all relief for copyright infringement is monetary.  
70 See 
court determines that . . . the action . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 
 
71 In contrast, under the Lanham Act, a trademark owner who fails to police their mark can be 
See 
Stores, Inc.
licensor of a registered trademark to take reasonable measures to detect and prevent misleading uses of 
his mark by his licensees or suffer cancellation of his federal  
72 See, e.g., Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 ( It must be obvious to every 
one familiar with equitable principles that it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice of 
an intended infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends large sums of money in 
its exploitation, and to intervene only when his speculation has proved a success. Delay under such 
circumstances allow
 
73 See, e.g., Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 453 (5th Cir. 2003) copyright defendant 
must prove four conjunctive elements to establish estoppel in such cases: (1) the plaintiff must know the 
facts of the defend
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
This morass of legal headaches goes beyond any doctrinal issues 
regarding authorship and provides ample reason to keep legal authorship in 
the hands of humans or entities controlled by humans. Without adequate 
remedies in equity or at law by which an AI can be sued for infringement, or 
adequate remedies to provide an AI author when its work has been infringed, 
it is meaningless to allow an AI to be considered an author within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act.74 
 
 
or must so act that the defendant has a right to believe that it is so intended; (3) the defendant must be 
ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the defendant must rel  
74 Liebesman, supra note 6 an AI is considered sentient enough to be able to 
negotiate licensing rights and have constitutional standing to file infringement suits, it is difficult to find 
an option which would confer rights in the work to a human person . .  
